From Incapacity to Incapacity Reinhold and Schelling about immoral Freedom after Kant

Are we free to act irrationally and evilly? Or are irrational and evil actions just consequences of our incapacity to act morally? The article discusses theses questions by referring to Kant's practical philosophy. In a first step, I shall address Kant's thesis given in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that a free will and a will under moral law be the same. This raises the problem of how it is possible to act immorally. In a second step, I will reconstruct Karl Leonhard Reinhold's attempt to make freedom to act immorally also viable by conceiving of freedom as a "basic faculty" ("Grundvermogen"). Finally, I argue that Schelling in his Freedom Essay builds on Reinhold, defining freedom as a "vital, positive capacity for good and evil" and making immoral actions comprehensible.