Cash holdings and employee welfare

被引:127
作者
Ghaly, Mohamed [1 ]
Viet Anh Dang [1 ]
Stathopoulos, Konstantinos [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, England
关键词
Cash holdings; Employee welfare; Implicit claims; Stakeholders; Human capital; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; STAKEHOLDER THEORY; DEBT; RISK; DETERMINANTS; CUSTOMERS; SUPPLIERS; BEHAVIOR; LEVERAGE; DEFAULT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.04.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the relation between employee welfare practices and corporate cash holdings. We find firms that are strongly committed to employee well-being, measured by ratings on employee relations, to hold more cash. The effect of employee welfare standards on cash holdings is stronger for firms in human-capital-intensive, competitive, and high-labor-mobility industries in which employees are more important to their businesses. These results are consistent with the predictions of the stakeholder theory. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence on the role human capital and employee relations play in a firm's cash management policy. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:53 / 70
页数:18
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