Reputation in auctions: Theory, and evidence from eBay

被引：292

作者：

Houser, D ^{[1
]}

Wooders, J

机构：

[1] George Mason Univ, Dept Econ, Interdisciplinary Ctr Econ Sci, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA

[2] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2006年 / 15卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

引用

页码：353 / 369

页数：17

共 15 条

[1] MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM
AKERLOF, GA
[J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (03) : 488 - 500
[2] The winner's curse, reserve prices, and endogenous entry:: empirical insights from eBay auctions
Bajari, P
Hortaçsu, A
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2003, 34 (02) : 329 - 355
[3] Withdrawable bids as winner's curse insurance
Harstad, RM
Rothkopf, MH
[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1995, 43 (06) : 983 - 994
[4] HOUSER D, 2000, 0001 U AR
[5] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
KREPS, DM
MILGROM, P
ROBERTS, J
WILSON, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252
[6] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION
KREPS, DM
WILSON, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279
[7] Lucking-Reiley D, 2000, J IND ECON, V48, P227
[8] LUCKINGREILEY D, 1999, UNPUB PNNIES EBAY DE
[9] Melnik MI, 2002, J IND ECON, V50, P337
[10] Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
Paarsch, HJ
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 1997, 78 (02) : 333 - 357

← 1 2 →