CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis

被引：593

作者：

Shivdasani, A ^{[1
]}

Yermack, D

机构：

[1] Univ N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, Chapel Hill, NC 27514 USA

[2] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1999年 / 54卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/0022-1082.00168

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study whether CEO involvement in the selection of new directors influences the nature of appointments to the board. When the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest; Stock price reactions to independent director appointments are significantly lower when the CEO is involved in director selection. Our evidence may illuminate a mechanism used by CEOs to reduce pressure from active monitoring, and we find a recent trend of companies removing CEOs from involvement in director selection.

引用

页码：1829 / 1853

页数：25

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