Sovereign bond market reactions to no-bailout clauses and fiscal rules - The Swiss experience

被引:27
作者
Feld, Lars P. [1 ,2 ]
Kalb, Alexander [3 ]
Moessinger, Marc-Daniel [4 ]
Osterloh, Steffen [5 ]
机构
[1] Walter Eucken Inst, Goethestr 10, Freiburg, Germany
[2] Univ Freiburg, Goethestr 10, Freiburg, Germany
[3] BayernLB, Brienner Str 18, D-80333 Munich, Germany
[4] ZEW Mannheim, L7,1, D-68161 Mannheim, Germany
[5] European Cent Bank, Sonnemannstr 20, D-60314 Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
Sub-national government bonds; Fiscal rules; No-bailout clause; Sovereign risk premium; YIELD SPREADS; DIRECT DEMOCRACY; DEBT SPILLOVERS; RISK PREMIA; GOVERNMENT; STATE; EMU; DETERMINANTS; INSTITUTIONS; CONTAGION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.09.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We analyse the effects of a credible no-bailout policy and stringent sub-national fiscal rules on the risk premia of Swiss sub national government bonds in the period from 1981 to 2007. In July 2003, the Swiss Supreme Court decided that the canton of Valais is not liable for municipal debt. This landmark decision reduced cantonal risk premia by about 26 basis points and cut the link between cantonal risk premia and the financial situation of the municipalities that existed before. The result demonstrates that a not fully credible no-bailout commitment can entail high costs for the potential guarantor. Additionally, strong and credible balanced budget rules reduce risk premia. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:319 / 343
页数:25
相关论文
共 54 条