Technology licensing, R&D and welfare

被引：33

作者：

Chang, Ray-Yun ^{[1
]}

Hwang, Hong ^{[2
,3
]}

Peng, Cheng-Hau ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Chinese Culture Univ, Dept Econ, Taipei, Taiwan

[2] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Econ, Taipei 10055, Taiwan

[3] Acad Sinica, RCHSS, Taipei, Taiwan

[4] Fu Jen Catholic Univ, Dept Econ, Taipei, Taiwan

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2013年 / 118卷 / 02期

关键词：

Technology licensing; R&D investment; Social welfare; SPILLOVERS; INNOVATION; DUOPOLY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.016

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper sets up a three-stage (R&D, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which only one of the firms undertakes a cost-reducing R&D and may license the developed technology to the others by means of a two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit royalty and an upfront fee) contract. It is found with surprise that if the licensor firm's R&D efficiency is high, the availability of licensing subdues the firm's R&D incentive, leading to a lower social welfare level. This result implies that a government has to be cautious when encouraging technology licensing among firms. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：396 / 399

页数：4

共 15 条

[1]

DASPREMONT C, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P1133

[2] Welfare reducing licensing [J].