Religious origins of democracy & dictatorship

被引:9
作者
Grigoriadis, Theocharis [1 ]
机构
[1] Free Univ Berlin, Sch Business & Econ, Inst East European Studies, Garystr 55, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
关键词
Religion; Modernization; Collectivism; Democracy; Dictatorship; GOODS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpolmod.2016.02.012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Weber considered the Protestant work ethic the foundation of modern capitalism. I extend Weber's theory by arguing that states with predominantly Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim populations have had a stronger inclination toward underdevelopment and dictatorship than states with Protestant or Jewish majorities. This is the case because their respective religious collectives (monastery, tariqa) promote the hierarchical provision of common goods at the expense of market incentives. I define the aforementioned three religions as collectivist, in contrast to Protestantism and Judaism, which I define as individualist. I provide a historical overview that designates the Jewish kibbutz as the collective of democracy and the Eastern Orthodox monastery as the collective of dictatorship. Focusing on collectivist economies, I find that modernization, as a credible commitment to the improved future provision of public goods, occurs when the threat of a radical government is imminent and when the leader has high extraction of tents from the economy. The emergence of radical governments is more likely in collectivist than in individualist economies. Historical illustrations from collectivist economies include the Russian Revolution, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the postwar welfare state in Western Europe. (C) 2016 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:785 / 809
页数:25
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