Does Corporate Governance Matter in the Contractual Form of Fund Management Companies in China?

被引：4

作者：

Yu, Ping ^{[1
]}

Tam, On Kit ^{[1
]}

Zhou, Jing ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] RMIT Univ, Coll Business, Melbourne, Vic, Australia

[2] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business, Chengdu 611130, Sichuan, Peoples R China

来源：

EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE | 2015年 / 51卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

China; corporate governance; fund management companies; performance; PERFORMANCE EVIDENCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; TOP MANAGEMENT; DIRECTORS; MECHANISMS; OWNERSHIP; BOARDS; WOMEN; STATE;

D O I：

10.1080/1540496X.2015.1026736

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Operating under a regulatory environment with weak enforcement of investor protection, the contractual form of fund management companies (FMCs) in China's emerging fund industry presents some complex governance issues in addition to the conventional agency problems of modern public corporations. Using 288 firm-year observations covering more than 98 percent of FMCs in China, this article presents the first systematic study on whether the quality of corporate governance mechanisms affects the performance of the contractual form of FMCs. Our results suggest that FMCs with good corporate governance do matter in generating favorable performance for fund investors in China.

引用

页码：S89 / S103

页数：15

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