States and common pool resources

被引：1
作者：
Lane, JE
Jensen, ST
机构：
来源：
SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES | 1996年 / 19卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-9477.1996.tb00384.x
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
The neo-institutionalist theory on the management of common pool resources by states in terms of international regimes is based on dubious assumptions about states as players. If one starts from alternative assumptions about interaction between asymmetrical players and the advantages of opportunistic behaviour, then it is easier to account for the collective action difficulties in a regime such as the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), which handles the environmental problems in the Baltic Sea region.
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页码：95 / 109
页数：15
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