Optimal wage redistribution in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market

被引：13

作者：

Bastani, Spencer ^{[1
,2
,3
,4
]}

Blumkin, Tomer ^{[4
,5
,6
]}

Micheletto, Luca ^{[2
,4
,7
,8
]}

机构：

[1] Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden

[2] Uppsala Ctr Fiscal Studies, Uppsala, Sweden

[3] Uppsala Ctr Labor Studies, Uppsala, Sweden

[4] CESifo, Dresden, Germany

[5] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

[6] IZA, Dresden, Germany

[7] Univ Milan, Dept Law, I-20122 Milan, Italy

[8] Bocconi Univ, Dondena Ctr Res Social Dynam & Publ Policy, Rome, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2015年 / 131卷

关键词：

Adverse selection; Labor market; Optimal taxation; Pooling; Redistribution; OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION; INSURANCE MARKETS; RAT RACE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we highlight a novel role played by the non-linear income tax in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. Relying on the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium concept, we show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：41 / 57

页数：17

共 18 条

[1] Why do firms train? Theory and evidence [J].