In explaining why party leaders may alter social security policy, the globalization literature highlights the limits governments face in implementing programmes supportive of social protection. This article calls for greater attention to the role of agency and political leadership in manufacturing social policy changes. Although international competition may set new and complex parameters within which party leaders interact, agency choice is crucial for explaining policy changes. The aim in this article is to introduce the strategic element to analysis of the redistributive impact of ruling parties. To this end, Australia is focused on as a case study and two factors are explored. First, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) is analysed as a multidimensional variable, particularly in terms of ideological coherence, the structure of competition and party organization. The argument rests on the assumption that party leaders enjoy a degree of freedom to act according to their own criteria. Second, the evolution of the bargaining power of trade union leaders and party leaders is examined. The article indicates that discretionary changes to social policy may also be the outcome of strategic considerations.
