The influence of director stock ownership and board discussion transparency on financial reporting quality

被引:24
作者
Rose, Jacob M. [1 ]
Mazza, Cheri R. [2 ]
Norman, Carolyn S. [3 ]
Rose, Anna M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Victoria Univ Wellington, Sch Accounting & Commercial Law, Wellington 6140, New Zealand
[2] Sacred Heart Univ, John F Welch Sch Business, Fairfield, CT 06825 USA
[3] Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Dept Accounting, Sch Business, Richmond, VA 23284 USA
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; AGENCY PROBLEMS; VALUATION; CONSEQUENCES;
D O I
10.1016/j.aos.2013.07.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Seventy-two active corporate directors participate in an experiment where management insists on aggressive recognition of revenue, but the chief audit executive proposes a more conservative approach. Results indicate interactive effects of director stock ownership and the transparency of director decisions. Stock-owning directors are more likely to oppose management's attempts to manage earnings when transparency increases. For non-stock owning directors, however, increasing transparency does not affect the likelihood that directors oppose management's attempts to manage earnings. The current study challenges suppositions that equate director stock ownership with improved financial reporting and higher corporate governance quality, and it provides evidence that increased transparency is beneficial when director compensation plans threaten director independence. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:397 / 405
页数:9
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