Self-interested board of director and stock price crash risk in loss-making firms

被引:5
作者
Lin, Feng-Yi [1 ]
Chang, Shen-Ho [2 ]
Huang, Shaio-Yan [3 ]
Wang, Teng-Shih [4 ]
机构
[1] Natl Taipei Univ Technol, Dept Business Management, Taipei, Taiwan
[2] Feng Chia Univ, Dept Accounting, Taichung, Taiwan
[3] Natl Chung Cheng Univ, Dept Accounting & Informat Technol, Chiayi, Taiwan
[4] Providence Univ, Dept Accounting, Taichung, Taiwan
关键词
Self-interested board of director; Agency problem; Stock price crash risk; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MARKET REACTIONS; INTERNAL CONTROL; PERFORMANCE; DISCLOSURE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1111/acfi.12686
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This research investigates the relationship between fat cat firms and crash risk. Our empirical results find that under industry fixed effects, fat cat firms are positively associated with stock price crash, demonstrating that a self-interested board of directors leads to a serious agency problem. We find consistent results after we control for other types of fat cat firms, sample selection bias, endogeneity problem and use different measurements of crash risk. Finally, we also report that under the within-firm scenario, the more frequently firms are listed as fat-cat firm announcements, the worse agency problem it encountered, which causes fat cat firms to have higher crash risk.
引用
收藏
页码:2853 / 2890
页数:38
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