Citizen participation in pollution permit markets

被引:19
作者
Malueg, DA
Yates, AJ
机构
[1] Univ Richmond, Dept Econ, E Claiborne Robins Sch Business, Richmond, VA 23173 USA
[2] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
[3] Tulane Univ, Dept Econ, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
关键词
pollution permits; permit retirement; rent seeking;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeem.2005.09.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Should citizens lobby the government to reduce pollution permit endowments or should they participate directly in the market by purchasing and retiring permits'? We address this question in a two-stage model. In the first stage firms and citizens exert effort to influence the endowment of permits. In the second stage firms, and perhaps citizens, participate in the permit market. Even when citizens choose not to purchase permits, the possibility of doing so may affect the equilibrium. In our basic model, citizens choose not to purchase permits; this result can be reversed if permits are grandfathered. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:205 / 217
页数:13
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