Estimating Causal Relationships Between Women's Representation in Government and Corruption

被引:46
作者
Esarey, Justin [1 ]
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Wake Forest Univ, Polit & Int Affairs, Winston Salem, NC 27109 USA
[2] Rice Univ, Poit Sci, Houston, TX USA
关键词
corruption and patronage; gender; women; legislatures; representation; GENDER-DIFFERENCES; FAIRER SEX; PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION; POLITICAL REPRESENTATION; DYNAMIC-MODELS; RISK; DEMOCRATIZATION; ACCOUNTABILITY; EMPOWERMENT; PERCEPTIONS;
D O I
10.1177/0010414019830744
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Does increasing the representation of women in government lead to less corruption, or does corruption prevent the election of women? Are these effects large enough to be substantively meaningful? Some research suggests that having women in legislatures reduces corruption levels, with a variety of theoretical rationales offered to explain the finding. Other research suggests that corruption is a deterrent to women's representation because it reinforces clientelistic networks that privilege men. Using instrumental variables, we find strong evidence that women's representation decreases corruption and that corruption decreases women's participation in government; both effects are substantively significant.
引用
收藏
页码:1713 / 1741
页数:29
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