G. Frege on negation as opposition without force

被引：0

作者：

Benmakhlouf, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 10, F-92001 Nanterre, France

来源：

REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE | 2001年 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper presents Frege's (1848-1925) logical point of view on negation. Negation is considered as a propriety of a thought one can express in an opposition scheme of propositions. Negation has no force and is not symmetrical with assertion, neither is it a predicate's magnet. However, in other fields than logic, negation can play this double part.

引用

页码：7 / 19

页数：13