Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium

被引:93
作者
Porter, Ryan [1 ]
Nudelman, Eugene [1 ]
Shoham, Yoav [1 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Nash equilibrium; computer science; algorithms;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.015
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present two simple search methods for computing a sample Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game: one for 2-player games and one for n-player games. Both algorithms bias the search towards supports that are small and balanced, and employ a backtracking procedure to efficiently explore these supports. Making use of a new comprehensive testbed, we test these algorithms on many classes of games, and show that they perform well against the state of the art-the Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-player games, and Simplicial Subdivision and Govindan-Wilson for n-player games. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:642 / 662
页数:21
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