Accountability and coercion: Is justice blind when it runs for office?

被引:221
作者
Huber, GA
Gordon, SC
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Inst Social & Policy Studies, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1519881
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Through their power to sentence, trial judges exercise enormous authority in the criminal justice system. In 39 American states, these judges stand periodically for reelection. Do elections degrade their impartiality? We develop a dynamic theory of sentencing and electoral control. judges discount the future value of retaining office relative to implementing preferred sentences. Voters are largely uninformed about judicial behavior, so even the outcome of a single publicized case can be decisive in their evaluations. Further, voters are more likely to perceive instances of underpunishment than overpunishment. Our theory predicts that elected judges will consequently become more punitive as standing for reelection approaches. Using sentencing data from 22,095 Pennsylvania criminal cases in the 1990s, we find strong evidence for this effect. Additional tests confirm the validity of our theory over alternatives. For the cases we examine, we attribute at least 1,818 to 2,705 years of incarceration to the electoral dynamic.
引用
收藏
页码:247 / 263
页数:17
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