Fiscal decentralization, fiscal rules and fiscal discipline

被引：34

作者：

Neyapti, Bilin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Bilkent Univ, Dept Econ, TR-06800 Ankara, Turkey

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2013年 / 121卷 / 03期

关键词：

Fiscal institutions; Fiscal decentralization; Fiscal rules; Budget deficits; CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE; PANEL-DATA; GROWTH; COUNTRIES; INFLATION; AGGREGATE; TRANSFERS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Fiscal decentralization (FD) and fiscal rules (FR) are institutional mechanisms that are implemented by varying degrees in increasing number of countries. This paper investigates empirically the effect of FR on the effectiveness of FD in achieving fiscal discipline. Panel evidence strongly supports that balanced budget and expenditure rules help FD to achieve this goal, while debt rule has a direct disciplinary effect. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：528 / 532

页数：5

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