Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

被引：6

作者：

Kolpin, V

Singell, L

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 1997年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

JEL Classification Numbers: J71; D82; C72.;

D O I：

10.1007/s001990050152

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The neoclassical model of labor market discrimination assumes the presence of either prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of worker productivity, or monopsony power. We show that when market agents control asymmetric information, strategic behavior can induce discriminatory hiring practices even when these market features are absent. Moreover, strategic interaction many distort public policies to the point of harming the segments of the work force they were designed to support.

引用

页码：175 / 184

页数：10

共 12 条

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