Investors' carbon risk exposure and their potential for shareholder engagement

被引:39
作者
Benz, Lukas [1 ]
Paulus, Stefan [1 ]
Scherer, Julia [1 ]
Syryca, Janik [1 ]
Truck, Stefan [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Augsburg, Chair Finance & Banking, Univ Str 16, Augsburg, Germany
[2] Macquarie Univ, Ctr Financial Risk, Sydney, NSW, Australia
关键词
carbon risk; corporate carbon emissions; decarbonization; institutional ownership; investor behavior; shareholder engagement; CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; EMISSIONS; OWNERSHIP; COST;
D O I
10.1002/bse.2621
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article examines the exposure to and management of carbon risks of different investor types. Considering the dual role as portfolio manager and partial owner, we analyze carbon risk for investors both in terms of exposure to portfolio values and in terms of responsibility as shareholder of carbon-intensive firms. We show that among various investor types, the preference for holding carbon-intensive stocks differs substantially, even when considering traditional investment decision parameters. In particular, it is governments whose portfolio values are most threatened by a carbon risk exposure of 49%, but at the same time, they prefer larger ownership shares in polluting firms. In contrast, individual investors, investment advisors, and mutual funds avoid holding stakes in these firms, while revealing only a moderate exposure of their assets to carbon risk. In view of the Paris Agreement, which includes the consistent steering of financial flows towards a low carbon transformation of the economy, our study provides policymakers with important implications regarding the coverage and effects of respective regulations. By identifying the ownership structures of carbon-intensive firms and respective owners' portfolio compositions, we also offer implications for further research on portfolio decarbonization and shareholders' influence of corporate carbon management.
引用
收藏
页码:282 / 301
页数:20
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