Outside options, component efficiency, and stability

被引：49
作者：
Casajus, Andre [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissen Liche Fak, D-04009 Leipzig, Germany
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2009年 / 65卷 / 01期
关键词：
TU game; Partition function form game; Outside option; Splitting; Coalition structure; Stability; GAMES; UTILITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting, a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：49 / 61
页数：13
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