Sample average approximation for the continuous type principal-agent problem

被引:10
作者
Singham, D., I [1 ]
机构
[1] Naval Postgrad Sch Monterey, Operat Res Dept, Monterey, CA 93943 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Pricing; Mechanism design; Principal-agent models; Sample average approximation; CARBON CAPTURE; CONTRACTS; STORAGE; INFORMATION; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2018.12.032
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We develop a method for finding approximate solutions to the continuous agent type principal-agent problem when analytical methods are not available. The solution is calculated by solving a discrete agent type version of the problem using sample average approximation and bootstrapping. We show how a solution to the approximate problem can be used to derive a lower bound and expected upper bound for the optimal objective function, and evaluate the error associated with the approximation. Numerical examples illustrate convergence in the approximate solution to the true solution as the number of samples increases. This works yields a method for obtaining some tractability in continuous type principal-agent problems where solutions were previously unavailable. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:1050 / 1057
页数:8
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