Possibility of strictly Pareto efficient consumption allocation in a general equilibrium in an oligopolistic economy

被引：0

作者：

Horniacek, Milan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Comenius Univ, Inst Publ Policy & Econ, Fac Social & Econ Sci, Bratislava, Slovakia

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS 2011, PTS I AND II | 2011年

关键词：

coalitions; general equilibrium; oligopoly; Pareto efficiency; strong perfect equilibrium;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze an abstract infinite horizon general equilibrium model of an oligopolistic economy. It is an extensive form non-cooperative game. A strict strong perfect general equilibrium (SSPGE) is the applied equilibrium concept. SSPGE requires that there does not exist a coalition of players that can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation payoffs of its members in some subgame by a coordinated deviation. We identify a class of SSPGEs, in which, in each subgame, the vector of consumers' equilibrium payoffs is strictly Pareto efficient.

引用

页码：272 / 278

页数：7