The role of the media in corporate governance: Do the media influence managers' capital allocation decisions?

被引:312
作者
Liu, Baixiao [1 ]
McConnell, John J. [2 ]
机构
[1] Florida State Univ, Coll Business, Tallahassee, FL 32312 USA
[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
Media; Capital allocation; Acquisition; Corporate governance; ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENTS; AGENCY PROBLEMS; RESPONSES; BIDDERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.06.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using 636 large acquisition attempts that are accompanied by a negative stock price reaction at their announcement ("value-reducing acquisition attempts") from 1990 to 2010, we find that, in deciding whether to abandon a value-reducing acquisition attempt, managers' sensitivity to the firm's stock price reaction at the announcement is influenced by the level and the tone of media attention to the proposed transaction. We interpret the results to imply that managers have reputational capital at risk in making corporate capital allocation decisions and that the level and tone of media attention heighten the impact of a value-reducing acquisition on the managers' reputational capital. To the extent that value-reducing acquisition attempts are more likely to be abandoned, the media can play a role in aligning managers' and shareholders' interests. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 17
页数:17
相关论文
共 27 条
[1]   Breaking up is hard to do? An analysis of termination fee provisions and merger outcomes [J].
Bates, TW ;
Lemmon, ML .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2003, 69 (03) :469-504
[2]  
Baumeister R. F., 2001, Review of General Psychology, V5, P323, DOI [DOI 10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323, DOI 10.1037//1089-2680.5.4.323, 10.1037//1089-2680.5.4.323]
[3]   Locking out rival bidders: The use of lockup options in corporate mergers [J].
Burch, TR .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2001, 60 (01) :103-141
[4]   Monitoring: Which institutions matter? [J].
Chen, Xia ;
Harford, Jarrad ;
Li, Kai .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 86 (02) :279-305
[5]   Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis [J].
Dahya, Jay ;
Dimitrov, Orlin ;
McConnell, John J. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 87 (01) :73-100
[6]  
Dyck A., 2002, The right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, P107
[7]   The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia [J].
Dyck, Alexander ;
Volchkova, Natalya ;
Zingales, Luigi .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2008, 63 (03) :1093-1135
[8]   AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J].
FAMA, EF .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) :288-307
[9]   SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [J].
FAMA, EF ;
JENSEN, MC .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1983, 26 (02) :301-325
[10]   Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover [J].
Farrell, KA ;
Whidbee, DA .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2002, 26 (12) :2249-2276