Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey

被引:507
作者
Claessens, Stijn [1 ]
Yurtoglu, B. Burcin [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, Res Dept, Int Monetary Fund, NL-1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Vallendar, Germany
关键词
Corporate governance; Emerging markets; Shareholder rights; Performance; Valuation; Creditor rights; Stakeholders; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; BUSINESS GROUPS; IMPLIED COST; FIRM VALUE; SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; INVESTOR PROTECTION; CROSS-LISTINGS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ememar.2012.03.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper reviews recent research on corporate governance, with a special focus on emerging markets. It finds that better corporate governance benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders. Numerous studies show these channels to operate at the level of firms, sectors and countries with causality increasingly often clearly identified. Evidence also shows that voluntary and market corporate governance mechanisms have less effect when a country's governance system is weak. Importantly, how corporate governance regimes change over time and how this impacts firms are receiving more attention recently. Less evidence is available on the direct links between corporate governance and social and environmental performance. The paper concludes by identifying issues requiring further study, including the special corporate governance issues of banks, and family-owned and state-owned firms, and the nature and determinants of public and private enforcement. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 33
页数:33
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