Quasi-Contractual Ministerial Steering of State Agencies: Its Intensity, Modes, and How Agency Characteristics Matter

被引:9
作者
Askim, Jostein [1 ]
Bjurstrom, Karl Hagen [1 ]
Kjaervik, Jonas [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oslo, Dept Polit Sci, Oslo, Norway
[2] Univ Oslo, Oslo, Norway
关键词
D O I
10.1080/10967494.2018.1547339
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
This article demonstrates the value of conceptualizing four ideal types when studying ministries' contract steering of state agencies-relational, double-whammy, performance, and behavioral steering-each defined by its combination of input- and output-oriented steering. In the system under study-Norway-about half of all agencies are subjected to steering with a clear profile; the other half are not. The two profiles often dismissed or overlooked in existing research-relational and double-whammy steering-are most common. Thus, introducing a contract regime has not meant a clear shift from input to output control, as posited by some. Most agency characteristics under study-size, age, political salience, and tasks-have significant effects on the likelihood that an agency is subjected to one type of steering or another. Still, the analysis suggests that agency-level characteristics constrain ministerial choice about which steering to practice only to a limited extent.
引用
收藏
页码:470 / 498
页数:29
相关论文
共 58 条
  • [1] Amirkhanyan A.A., Kim H.J., Lambright K.T., Do Relationships Matter? Assessing the Association between Relationship Design and Contractor Performance, Public Performance & Management Review, 34, 2, pp. 189-220, (2010)
  • [2] Askim J., The Role of Performance Management in the Steering of Executive Agencies: Layered, Imbedded, or Disjointed?, Public Performance & Management Review, 38, 3, pp. 365-394, (2015)
  • [3] Askim J., Kjaervik J., (2015)
  • [4] Bach T., Fleischer J., Hustedt T., Organisation Und Steurung Zentralstaatlicher Behörden. Agenturen im Westeuropäischen Vergleich, (2010)
  • [5] Binderkrantz A.S., Christensen J.G., Governing Danish Agencies by Contract: From Negotiated Freedom to the Shadow of Hierarchy, Journal of Public Policy, 29, 1, pp. 55-78, (2009)
  • [6] Binderkrantz A.S., Holm M., Korsager K., Performance Contracts and Goal Attainment in Government Agencies, International Public Management Journal, 14, 4, pp. 445-463, (2011)
  • [7] Bouckaert G., “Public Sector Performance Management in a Principal/Agent Context: Some Reflections.”, Inter and Intra Government Arrangements for Productivity: An Agency Approach, pp. 137-145, (1998)
  • [8] Chenhall R.H., Management Control Systems Design within its Organizational Context: Findings from Contingency-Based Research and Directions for the Future, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28, 2-3, pp. 127-168, (2003)
  • [9] Davis J.H., Schoorman F.D., Donaldson L., Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management, Academy of Management Review, 22, 1, pp. 20-47, (1997)
  • [10] Druckman J.N., Warwick P.V., The Missing Piece: Measuring Portfolio Salience in Western European Parliamentary Democracies, European Journal of Political Research, 44, 1, pp. 17-42, (2005)