A Dogma of Naturalism

被引:0
作者
Sinclair, Nathan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sydney, Dept Philosophy, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
关键词
analytic; continuous; distinction; holism; limits; method; naturalism; Quine;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01768.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
One of the major historical effects of Quine's attacks upon the analytic- synthetic distinction has been to popularise the belief that philosophy is continuous with science. Currently, most philosophers believe that such continuity is an inevitable consequence of naturalism. This article argues that though Quine's semantic holism does imply that there is no sharp distinction between truths discoverable by scientific investigation and truths discoverable by philosophical investigation, it also implies that there is a perfectly sharp and natural distinction between natural science and naturalistic philosophy.
引用
收藏
页码:551 / 566
页数:16
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