The unimportance of being any future person

被引：4

作者：

Gustafsson, Johan E. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ York, Dept Philosophy, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2018年 / 175卷 / 03期

关键词：

Personal identity; Division; Fission; Indeterminacy; Survival; What matters; IDENTITY; BRUECKNER; PARFIT;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-017-0890-9

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Derek Parfit's argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit's argument so that it works against the platitude on the intended reading.

引用

页码：745 / 750

页数：6

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