Skill differences in corporate acquisitions

被引：17

作者：

Jaffe, Jeffrey ^{[1
]}

Pedersen, David ^{[2
]}

Voetmann, Torben ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[2] Drexel Univ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[3] Cornerstone Res, San Francisco, CA 94111 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2013年 / 23卷

关键词：

Mergers and acquisitions; Skill; Persistence; CEO; BIDDING FIRMS; GAINS; OBJECTIVES; GOVERNANCE; RETURNS; PAYMENT; DRIVE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.08.007

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Are there skill differences in mergers and acquisitions? To investigate this question, we focus on persistence in the performance of corporate acquirers. We find persistence only when successive deals occur under the same CEO and conclude that skill differences in acquisitions reside with the CEO, not with the firm as a whole. These differences are economically meaningful. An acquirer that was successful in its last deal and kept its CEO earns 1.02% more on its next deal than does a previously-unsuccessful firm that kept its CEO. This percentage difference is equivalent to a $175 million difference in value creation. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：166 / 181

页数：16

共 44 条

[1] Learning from repetitive acquisitions: Evidence from the time between deals [J].