Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

被引：2

作者：

Block, Juan I. ^{[1
]}

Levine, David K. ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cambridge, Fac Econ, Cambridge CB3 9DD, England

[2] European Univ Inst, Dept Econ, Via Piazzuola 43, I-50133 Florence, Italy

[3] Washington Univ, Dept Econ, Campus Box 1208, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2016年 / 45卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Repeated game; Folk theorem; Self-referential game; Approximate equilibrium; FOLK THEOREM; CONTRACTILE CONTRACTS; COMMUNICATION; COOPERATION; EQUILIBRIA;

D O I：

10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting.

引用

页码：971 / 984

页数：14

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