Asymmetric Information and Middleman Margins: An Experiment with Indian Potato Farmers

被引：54

作者：

Mitra, Sandip ^{[1
]}

Mookherjee, Dilip ^{[2
]}

Torero, Maximo ^{[3
]}

Visaria, Sujata ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Indian Stat Inst, Kolkata, India

[2] Boston Univ, Boston, MA 02215 USA

[3] World Bank, Boston, MA USA

[4] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS | 2018年 / 100卷 / 01期

关键词：

AGRICULTURAL MARKETS; PERFORMANCE; IMPACT;

D O I：

10.1162/REST_a_00699

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not knowwholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farmgate sales and prices were unaffected, but pass-through to farmgate prices increased. These results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen, with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions, or risk-sharing contracts.

引用

页码：1 / 13

页数：13

共 29 条

[1] Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural Markets in Niger [J].