共 54 条
Product market competition and stock price crash risk: Exploring the role of managerial ownership
被引:7
作者:
Benkraiem, Ramzi
[1
]
Galariotis, Emilios
[1
]
Guizani, Assil
[2
]
Lakhal, Faten
[3
,4
]
机构:
[1] Audencia Business Sch, AACSB EQUIS & AMBA, Nantes, France
[2] EDC Paris Business Sch, OCRE Res Lab, Paris, France
[3] Leonard Vinci Pole Univ, Res Ctr, F-92916 Paris, France
[4] Univ Paris Est, Inst Rech Gest EA 2354, Creteil, France
关键词:
Product market competition;
Stock price crash risk;
Managerial ownership;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
FIRM;
COMPENSATION;
MANAGEMENT;
INCENTIVES;
D O I:
10.1016/j.ribaf.2022.101786
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether product market competition is a means of external shareholders' protection likely to decrease the stock price crash risk. The results show that product market competition is an effective corporate governance mechanism that is likely to constrain managers to disclose bad news regularly to the market, which in turn mitigates the risk of stock price crashes. The results also show that the negative effect of product market competition on stock price crashes is more pronounced for owner-managers. These results suggest that managerial ownership is likely to align managerial interests with shareholders ones.
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页数:12
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