Corporate board attributes and bankruptcy

被引:114
作者
Platt, Harlan [1 ]
Platt, Marjorie [1 ]
机构
[1] Northeastern Univ, Coll Business Adm, Finance & Insurance Grp, Boston, MA 02115 USA
关键词
Boards of directors; Bankruptcy; Stock ownership; Board composition; Board characteristics; GOVERNANCE; FIRM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.08.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines how the composition and characteristics of corporate boards relates to firms' success and solvency; the study here focuses on the question of insolvency. This study finds that both board composition and member characteristics relate to whether or not firms can avoid bankruptcy. Boards have a major role to play in whether or not the company can remain solvent. A more versus less independent board, one which is larger and comprised of older members, has more members currently serving as CEOs of other companies, and whose independent/outside directors own less stock is best positioned to help a firm remain out of bankruptcy. Firms may use the results to custom tailor boards as older members retire and new members are inducted. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1139 / 1143
页数:5
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