Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

被引：12

作者：

Fibich, G

Gavious, A

Sela, A

机构：

[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-81405 Beer Sheva, Israel

[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Fac Engn Sci, Sch Ind Engn & Management, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

[3] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Math Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 75卷 / 02期

关键词：

asymmetric auctions; first-price auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00611-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study first-price auctions with n bidders where bidders' types (valuations for the object) are drawn independently according to heterogeneous distribution functions. We show a relation between the distributions of high types and their equilibrium bids. On the other hand, we show that there is no relation between the distributions of types and equilibrium bids of low types, i.e. the equilibrium bids of low types are invariable. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science BY All rights reserved.

引用

页码：283 / 287

页数：5