CEO Reputation and Dividend Payouts

被引：0

作者：

Likitratcharoen, Danai ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Inst Dev Adm, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India

来源：

ECONOMICS, BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT (ICEBM 2011) | 2011年 / 22卷

关键词：

CEO reputation; Dividend payouts; CEO overconfidence; RISK-TAKING; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; BEHAVIOR; MANAGERS;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO reputation and firm's dividend payouts. The results show that reputable CEOs tend to make more investment and pay lower dividends. These results support the overconfident hypothesis that reputable CEOs tend to be overconfident and use the funds to make more investment rather than paying out dividends. These results are important because they show that a manager-specific attribute, i.e. reputation, has a significant impact on a crucial corporate outcome the extent of corporate dividend payouts.

引用

页码：97 / 101

页数：5

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