Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking

被引：4
|
作者：
Balinski, Michel [1 ,3 ]
Jennings, Andrew [2 ]
Laraki, Rida [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Ecole Polytech, Dept Econ, F-91128 Palaiseau, France
[2] Arizona State Univ, Dept Math & Stat, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
[3] CNRS, F-75700 Paris, France
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 105卷 / 02期
关键词：
Borda; Condorcet; Incompatibility; Electing; Ranking;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.024
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Borda proposed to assign points to each of m candidates. Condorcet proposed to assign points to each of m! rankings of candidates. One is appropriate for electing, the other for ranking. They satisfy different types of monotonicity that are incompatible. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：145 / 147
页数：3
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