Cryptographic Side-Channel Signaling and Authentication via Fingerprint Embedding

被引:37
作者
Perazzone, Jake Bailey [1 ]
Yu, Paul L. [3 ]
Sadler, Brian M. [3 ]
Blum, Rick S. [2 ]
机构
[1] Lehigh Univ, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
[2] Lehigh Univ, Elect & Comp Engn Dept, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
[3] US Army, Res Lab, Adelphi, MD 20783 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Authentication; fingerprint embedding; side-channel signaling; physical layer security; PHYSICAL-LAYER; PROBABILITY;
D O I
10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812202
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Authentication via fingerprint embedding at the physical layer utilizes noise in the wireless channel to attain a certain degree of information theoretic security that traditional HMAC methods cannot provide. Fingerprint embedding refers to a key-aided process of superimposing a low-power tag to the primary message waveform for the purpose of authenticating the transmission. The tag is uniquely created from the message and key and successful authentication is achieved when the correct tag is detected by the receiver. This paper generalizes a framework for embedding physical layer fingerprints to create an authenticated side-channel for minimal cost. Side-channel information is conveyed to the receiver through the transmitter's choice of tag from a secret codebook generated by the primary message and a shared secret key. In addition, a new linear coding scheme is introduced which enhances the ability to trade off the performance goals of authentication, side-channel rate, secrecy, and privacy.
引用
收藏
页码:2216 / 2225
页数:10
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