Contagion in Financial Networks: A Threat Index

被引:43
作者
Demange, Gabrielle [1 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Hautes Etud Sci Sociales, Paris Sch Econ, F-75014 Paris, France
关键词
propagation of defaults; financial linkages; intervention policy; SYSTEMIC RISK; RESOLUTION; STABILITY; MARKET;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2016.2592
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper proposes to measure the spillover effects that cross liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion-the aggregate debt repayments-the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures-one for each institution-summarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources, and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 European Union countries.
引用
收藏
页码:955 / 970
页数:16
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