Privacy-Enhanced Capabilities for VANETs using Direct Anonymous Attestation

被引：0

作者：

Whitefield, Jorden ^{[1
]}

Chen, Liqun ^{[1
]}

Giannetsos, Thanassis ^{[1
]}

Schneider, Steve ^{[1
]}

Treharne, Helen ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Surrey, Surrey Ctr Cyber Secur, Guildford, Surrey, England

来源：

2017 IEEE VEHICULAR NETWORKING CONFERENCE (VNC) | 2017年

基金：

英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;

关键词：

Security; Privacy; Trusted Computing; Direct Anonymous Attestation; Vehicle-2-X;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we propose a novel secure and privacy-preserving solution for V2X systems leveraging widely accepted trusted computing technologies. Our approach systematically addresses all key aspects, i.e., security, privacy and accountability (revocation). By reflecting on state-of-the-art pseudonym architectures, we identify their limitations focusing on pseudonym reusage policies and revocation mechanisms. We propose the use of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) algorithms to enhance existing V2X security architectures. The novelty of our proposed solution is its decentralized approach in shifting trust from the infrastructure to vehicles. Applying DAA in V2X enables enhanced privacy protection than is possible in current architectures through user-controlled linkability. The paper presents the incorporation of DAA algorithms within V2X together with rigorous security and privacy arguments.

引用

页码：123 / 130

页数：8