Political Tie Heterogeneity and the Impact of Adverse Shocks on Firm Value

被引:157
作者
Sun, Pei [1 ]
Mellahi, Kamel [2 ]
Wright, Mike [3 ]
Xu, Haoping [1 ]
机构
[1] Fudan Univ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[3] Imperial Coll Business Sch, London, England
关键词
China; emerging economies; network embeddedness; political risk; political tie; tie heterogeneity; EMERGING ECONOMIES; MANAGEMENT RESEARCH; STATE OWNERSHIP; SOCIAL NETWORKS; PERFORMANCE; STRATEGY; EMBEDDEDNESS; CONNECTIONS; TRANSITION; GOVERNMENT;
D O I
10.1111/joms.12165
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Past research has recognized the contingent value of corporate political ties but largely neglects their heterogeneity. Drawing on the political embeddedness perspective and literature on emerging economy political institutions, we develop hypotheses regarding how political networks comprising managerial and government ownership ties may have different valuation effects in the face of adverse political shocks. Examining stock market responses to an unanticipated, high-profile political event in China, we find a negative valuation effect of managerial ties to municipal government, but an insignificant effect of government ownership ties. Further, companies combining managerial and ownership ties experienced less post-shock reduction in market value than those holding only managerial political ties. These findings shed light on the values of different configurations of corporate political ties and inform firms of potential ways to manage ubiquitous political hazards in emerging economies.
引用
收藏
页码:1036 / 1063
页数:28
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