Incorporation of competitors' reactions in discrete competitive facility location and design

被引:0
作者
Saidani, Nasreddine [1 ]
Chen, Haoxun [1 ]
Chu, Feng [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Technol Troyes, CNRS, FRE 2848, ICD, 12 Rue Marie Curie BP 2060, F-10010 Troyes, France
[2] Univ Evry Val Essonne, CNRS, FRE 3190, IBISC, F-91020 Evry, France
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT (IESM'2011): INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR NETWORKED MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES MANAGEMENT | 2011年
关键词
Discrete competitive facility location and design; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Genetic Algorithm; MODEL;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
When a retail firm locates a new facility in a network and begins attracting customers in an existing market, it will typically stimulate certain reactions of other firms offering the same goods. To maximize its market share by optimizing its location and design decisions, the entering firm must anticipate the reactions of the facilities already present in the market. Since the relocation of an existing facility is expensive, the competitors usually improve their qualities to compete with the new firm so as to minimize their market share lost. In this paper, we develop a new method that takes into account the reactions of the facilities already present for a discrete competitive facility location and design problem. The method proposed uses a genetic algorithm to search for optimal or near-optimal locations of new facilities and uses Nash equilibrium to determine the best quality of each facility.
引用
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页码:126 / 133
页数:8
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