Political connection and the walking dead: Evidence from China's privately owned firms*

被引:30
作者
He, Qing [1 ,2 ]
Li, Xiaoyang [3 ]
Zhu, Wenyu [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Renmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, 59 Zhongguancun St, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[2] Renmin Univ China, Sch Finance, 59 Zhongguancun St, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[3] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Zombie firm; Political connection; Resource misallocation; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; BANK LOANS; ENTRENCHMENT; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2018.12.007
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using a sample of privately owned listed firms in China, we document that firms' political con-nections have a positive effect on their likelihood of becoming insolvent and inefficient (which we call zombies or zombie firms). The results are more pronounced for firms that are located in re-gions with extensive government intervention or weak institutional environment. In addition, for firms without political connections, the presence of zombie firms has larger negative spillover effects on the investment and productivity of healthy firms compared with zombie firms in the same industry. Curiously, such differential negative spillover effects are not observed for firms with political connections.
引用
收藏
页码:1056 / 1070
页数:15
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