The Principal-agent Problem in the Joint Venture

被引:0
作者
Petricek, Martin [1 ]
Koklar, Robin [1 ]
机构
[1] Inst Hospitality Management, Dept Econ & Econ, Svidnicka 506, Prague 18100 8, Czech Republic
来源
HOTELNICTVI, TURISMUS A VZDELAVANI | 2017年
关键词
Principal-agent problem; Joint Venture; managerial decision-making;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper focuses on introducing principal-agent problem in the framework of the international cooperation of business entities based on joint venture. In the text the approaches of traditional microeconomic theory and the also alternative concepts of the problem are presented. The output is the application of the decision-making model of the managers into joint venture. This model clarifies the individual elements that can influence the decisions of the managers.
引用
收藏
页码:143 / 149
页数:7
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