Public reason and extension of lifespan

The paper is mainly concerned with the problem of whether the question of extension of lifespan may be included in the constitutional essentials (the basic prescriptions) of a well ordered society; either as a right that must be protected, or as a prohibition, More precisely, when put in the terms of a possible prohibition, the question is about whether there are reasons that may be endorsed in the basic legislative institutions of society, as a matter of the constitutional essentials of a state, as a ground for the prohibition of research or technological practice, with the aim of sensibly extending human lifespan. It may appear as obvious that, if the answer to this question is not positivem, freedom to engage in these activities immediately follows. However, this is not true. Even if there is no possibility to establish a prohibition at the level of constitutional essentials, it may still be possible to legislate at lower levels for a prohibition. As a consequence, there is another problem, i.e. the question of whether we may establish, as a matter of constitutional essentials, the right to develop research (for example, by private funds). and make use of technological resources, with the aim of sensibly extending human lifespan. Two kinds of arguments are analysed. The one saying the extension of lifespan is damaging, because it threats human nature; and the one saying that extension of lifespan is not helpful, because it leads to a life of boredom and tediousness.