Strong ties promote the evolution of cooperation in dynamic networks

被引:41
作者
Melamed, David [1 ]
Simpson, Brent [2 ]
机构
[1] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[2] Univ S Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
关键词
Agent-based model; Cooperation; Dynamic network; Evolution; Tie strength; TIT-FOR-TAT; SOCIAL NETWORKS; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; COLLECTIVE ACTION; WEAK-TIES; EMERGENCE; ALTRUISM; STRENGTH; BEHAVIOR; TRUST;
D O I
10.1016/j.socnet.2015.11.001
中图分类号
Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
030303 ;
摘要
Research on the evolution of cooperation in networked populations has assumed that ties are simply present or absent. Here we bring relational sociological insights about the strength of ties to bear on the problem of cooperation in dynamic networks. We argue that the value of ties affects their strength, which in turn promotes cooperation. We evaluate this argument with two studies. First, results from an agent-based model are consistent with the logic of our argument and are robust across a variety of initial conditions. Second, results from a controlled laboratory experiment with human participants support the key predictions. Across both studies we demonstrate that tie strength, operationalized as relationship duration, mediates the impact of tie value on cooperation. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:32 / 44
页数:13
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