Coupling and Decoupling of Unfairness and Anger in Ultimatum Bargaining

被引:44
|
作者
Srivastava, Joydeep [1 ]
Espinoza, Francine [1 ]
Fedorikhin, Alexander [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, Dept Mkt, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA
关键词
emotions; anger; cognitive appraisal; fairness; ultimatum; bargaining; DECISION-MAKING; EMOTION; APPRAISAL; MISATTRIBUTION; RECIPROCITY; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; PATTERNS; FAIRNESS;
D O I
10.1002/bdm.631
中图分类号
B849 [应用心理学];
学科分类号
040203 ;
摘要
Although previous research has demonstrated the importance of emotions in ultimatum bargaining, this research provides a more direct, convergent test of the role of anger in explaining rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. First, using appraisal theory of emotions, this research examines the extent to which the cognitive appraisal of unfairness leads to the emotion of anger, which in turn, drives punitive behavior (i.e., rejection of offers). Second, this research explores the possibility of decoupling the emotion of anger from its antecedent appraisal of unfairness in order to attenuate responders' inclination to reject unfair offers. Third, following the current research tradition that goes beyond a valence-based approach, we differentiate between the negative emotions of anger and sadness and examine whether it is the specific emotion of anger that is relevant to the cognitive appraisal of unfairness or the general negative valence of the emotion. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:475 / 489
页数:15
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