Coupling and Decoupling of Unfairness and Anger in Ultimatum Bargaining

被引:44
|
作者
Srivastava, Joydeep [1 ]
Espinoza, Francine [1 ]
Fedorikhin, Alexander [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, Dept Mkt, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA
关键词
emotions; anger; cognitive appraisal; fairness; ultimatum; bargaining; DECISION-MAKING; EMOTION; APPRAISAL; MISATTRIBUTION; RECIPROCITY; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; PATTERNS; FAIRNESS;
D O I
10.1002/bdm.631
中图分类号
B849 [应用心理学];
学科分类号
040203 ;
摘要
Although previous research has demonstrated the importance of emotions in ultimatum bargaining, this research provides a more direct, convergent test of the role of anger in explaining rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. First, using appraisal theory of emotions, this research examines the extent to which the cognitive appraisal of unfairness leads to the emotion of anger, which in turn, drives punitive behavior (i.e., rejection of offers). Second, this research explores the possibility of decoupling the emotion of anger from its antecedent appraisal of unfairness in order to attenuate responders' inclination to reject unfair offers. Third, following the current research tradition that goes beyond a valence-based approach, we differentiate between the negative emotions of anger and sadness and examine whether it is the specific emotion of anger that is relevant to the cognitive appraisal of unfairness or the general negative valence of the emotion. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:475 / 489
页数:15
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] The Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Effects of Anger in Ultimatum Bargaining
    Reed, Lawrence Ian
    Okun, Sara
    Cooley, Cameryn
    ADAPTIVE HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND PHYSIOLOGY, 2020, 6 (02) : 236 - 248
  • [2] The Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Effects of Anger in Ultimatum Bargaining
    Lawrence Ian Reed
    Sara Okun
    Cameryn Cooley
    Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, 2020, 6 : 236 - 248
  • [3] Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information
    Gonzalez-Sanchez, Eric
    Loyola, Gino
    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2024, 127 : 1 - 11
  • [4] Strategic ignorance in ultimatum bargaining
    Conrads, Julian
    Irlenbusch, Bernd
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2013, 92 : 104 - 115
  • [5] Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining
    Koning, Lukas
    Steinel, Wolfgang
    van Beest, Ilja
    van Dijk, Eric
    ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, 2011, 115 (01) : 35 - 42
  • [6] EVOLUTION AND ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
    William Harms
    Theory and Decision, 1997, 42 : 147 - 175
  • [7] Evolution and ultimatum bargaining
    Harms, W
    THEORY AND DECISION, 1997, 42 (02) : 147 - 175
  • [8] An evaluation of the Ultimatum Game as a measure of irritability and anger
    Grondal, Maria
    Ask, Karl
    Winblad, Stefan
    PLOS ONE, 2024, 19 (08):
  • [9] Fear and guilt in proposers: Using emotions to explain offers in ultimatum bargaining
    Nelissen, Rob M. A.
    Leliveld, Marijke C.
    van Dijk, Eric
    Zeelenberg, Marcel
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2011, 41 (01) : 78 - 85
  • [10] Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining
    Hyndman, Kyle
    Walker, Matthew J.
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2022, 132 : 90 - 105