Quality information acquisition and disclosure with green manufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain

Green manufacturers are faced with decision problems whether to acquire the quality information from third party assessment agencies and to disclose the quality information to other supply chain members. While the existing research of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) has not considered the voluntary and mandatory information disclosure, this study considers the quality information disclosure strategies of a green manufacturer after acquiring the quality information in the closed-loop supply chain. (1) The study first evaluates the performance of this new closed-loop supply chain system considering the quality information disclosure and acquisition, by new models integrating the quality information decisions with the remanufacturing operational decisions. To our knowledge, this paper is an early research of closed-loop supply chain to consider and compare voluntary information disclosure and mandatory information disclosure. (2) The study provides a new decision tool to assist green manufacturers in making decisions on acquiring the quality information from a third-party quality assessment agency before disclosing the quality information. Interestingly, the study finds that the profits of closed-loop supply chain members are higher under the mandatory information disclosure when the green manufacturer refuses to assess the product quality and acquire the information from a third-part quality assessment agency. (3) The study further considers the consumer preference of green products, and get useful managerial insights that the green manufacturer is willing to pay a higher information acquisition cost to acquire the quality information when consumers prefer high quality. (4) Finally, the study provides the practical implications and finds the new condition under which a green manufacturer is willing to disclose the product quality information in closed-loop supply chains.