Does it matter whom an agent serves? Evidence from recent changes in real estate agency law

被引：15

作者：

Curran, C ^{[1
]}

Schrag, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 43卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/467455

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Recent changes in real estate law hastened the shift from a seller's agency regime, in which real estate agents serve the interests of sellers, to a buyer's agency regime, in which agents serve the interests of buyers. Using data from the Atlanta real estate market, we show that the shift to buyer's agency led to a significant decline in real estate prices in the market for relatively expensive houses, while real estate prices did not significantly change in the market for relatively inexpensive homes. In both markets, the average time needed to sell a house fell after the change in agency regimes. These results are consistent with a conclusion that a shift to buyer's agency improves the efficiency of the search process.

引用

页码：265 / 284

页数：20

共 13 条

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BROWN RB, 1995, CREIGHTON LAW REV, V29, P29

[2]

FED. TRADE COMM'N, 1983, RES REAL EST BROK IN, P108

[3] ESTIMATING REGRESSION-MODELS WITH MULTIPLICATIVE HETEROSCEDASTICITY [J].